INTRODUCTION THIS PAPER CONSIDERS a repeated principal agent relationship with a risk neutral
principal and risk averse agent. It is assumed that the principal can borrow and save at a fixed interest rate but the agent can neither borrow nor save. The agent discounts future consumption. It is shown that for any optimal contract, a simple relationship must always hold between the wages offered in any two adjacent periods. The inverse of the agent's marginal utility of income evaluated at any wage must be equal to the conditional expected value of the inverse of next period's marginal utility of income. Although this relationship does not fully characterize the optimal contract, it does imply a number of interesting properties of it.
First, it is shown that memory plays a role in every Pareto-optimal contract. Whenever an outcome affects the current wage it also affects the future periods' wages. Second, it is shown that the expected wage payment will rise (fall) over time if the inverse of the agent's marginal utility is concave (convex). For the class of HARA utility functions, expected wages are shown to increase or decrease over time depending upon whether the agent's risk tolerance increases at a rate greater than or less than 1. Expected wages are constant if the agent's utility is logarithmic. Third, it is shown that the restriction of the agent's access to credit is necessary to achieve a Pareto-optimal outcome. In particular, under every Pareto-optimal contract for every outcome of every period the agent would choose to save some of his wage if he could.
The Aside from the specific technical results outlined above, this analysis suggests a useful intuition for thinking about repeated incentive problems, especially when the relationship is finite or the agent discounts future income. In these cases the intuitions developed for the no-discounting infinite-horizon case are not applicable. The repetition of a moral hazard relationship creates the opportunity for intertemporal risk sharing. The optimal contract always takes advantage of this, i.e., memory plays a role in the optimal contract. However, because of the incentive problem the agent is not fully insured and the agent is left with a residual desire to intertemporally self-insure through the use of credit markets.
THE BASIC RESULT
For ease of exposition it will be assumed that the relationship between the principal and agent lasts two periods.3 Each period the agent chooses an action, a, from a set A. The outcome can be one of N dollar returns to the principal, .XI, * * *, XN}. Let pj(a) denote the probability of xj occurring given that action a is taken.
The principal is risk-neutral and can borrow or save at the interest rate r. He therefore desires to maximize expected discounted income using a discount rate of /(l + r). Let a denote this discount rate. The agent's preferences are represented by the discounted sum of period-by-period utility given by Note that if the agent has a stronger rate of time preference than the principal (i.e., 3 < a) the sufficient condition for wages to fall still holds but that for wages to rise does not. That is, when the agent values current income more highly there is an additional reason for wage payments to be skewed towards the beginning of the relationship. In a similar fashion, if the principal values current income more highly there is a tendency for wages to be more skewed to the end of the relationship.
The sufficient conditions in Proposition 3 will always apply if v belongs to the broad class of utility functions called HARA utility functions. A HARA utility function exhibits linear risk tolerance. That is, for some numbers 8 and y, y -I Straightforward calculation shows that when the agent has a HARA utility function, expected wages will be nondecreasing (nonincreasing) if y> ( <) 1.
ACCESS TO CREDIT
This section shows that the restriction of the agent's access to credit is necessary to achieve a Pareto optimum. Perhaps more surprisingly, it is shown that the agent is always left with a desire to save some of his wage and never to borrow against future wages. The agent's saving and borrowing policy can be viewed as a second decision the agent makes in addition to his effort level. This proposition is, therefore, an example of the principle that it will generally be Pareto-improving to contractually control as many of an agent's decisions as possible in order to gain more leverage on the incentive problem over effort.i PROPOSI-TION 4: Suppose that w is a Parelo-optimal contract under the assumption that the agent cannot borrow or save. Suppose that after the period I outcome is announced that the agent is suddenly allowed to borrow or save at the interest rate r. Then (i) the agent will not wishl to borrow money, (ii) if the agent's period 2 wage conditional on the period 1 outcome can assume two values with positive probability, the agent will wish to save money. Let pji(a) be the probability of outcome x1 given signal yi is observed and action a is taken. Let qi be the probability of signal i being observed in any period. Two cases can now be considered depending upon whether or not the agent is allowed to transmit a report on what signal he has observed to the principal. First, the case of no information transmission will be considered. In this case, the agent's strategy space for a single period can be viewed as the set for all functions from Y to A., i.e., the agent chooses a rule that specifies his action contingent on his signal. Let F denote this strategy space and let f denote an element of F. For a single period, both the principal's and agent's expected utility can be written as functions of f and w, the wage contract. Furthermore, if the agent's utility function is separable in w and a, his expected utility is also separable in w and f. Therefore, the analysis of this paper applies immediately to this case when F is viewed as the agent's action space. Diamond It will be assumed without loss of generality that the wage contract is always chosen so that the agent reports his observations truthfully." By using the same technique as in Proposition 1 it is straightforward to show that the analogous result still holds. Namely, for any Pareto-optimal contract it must be true that 
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